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ABSTRACT 
Distributed Generation (DG) units are increasingly installed in the power systems. Distribution Compa-
nies (DisCo) can opt to purchase the electricity from DG in an energy purchase contract to supply the 
customer demand and reduce energy loss. This paper proposes a framework for optimal contract pricing 
of independent dispatchable DG units considering competition among them. While DG units tend to 
increase their profit from the energy purchase contract, DisCo minimizes the demand supply cost.  Mul-
ti-leader follower game theory concept is used to analyze the situation in which competing DG units 
offer the energy price to DisCo and DisCo determines the DG generation. A bi-level approach is used to 
formulate the competition in which each DG problem is the upper-level problem and the DisCo problem 
is considered as the lower-level one. Combining the optimality conditions of all upper-level problems 
with the lower level problem results in a multi-DG equilibrium problem formulated as an equilibrium 
problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). Using a nonlinear approach, the EPEC problem is refor-
mulated as a single nonlinear optimization model which is simultaneously solved for all independent DG 
units. The proposed framework was applied to the Modified IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Test System. 
Performance and robustness of the proposed framework in determining econo-technically fare DG con-
tract price has been demonstrated through a series of analyses.  
 
Keywords: Distributed Generation (DG), Distribution Company (DisCo), Pricing, Game Theory, Multi-
leader follower, Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). 
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Nomenclature 
A. Indexes and Sets 
,k l   Node number indices. 
i   Distributed generation unit index. 
kl   Composed index for a line between nodes k and l. 
K   Set of nodes. 
k
L   Set of nodes connected to node k.  
I   Set of leaders. 
T  Set of time period  
S Set of slack variables s 
K′, K′′, K′′′, K′′′′ K′′′′′, K′′′′′′ Subsets of S 
B. Parameters 
( )dkP t  
Active power demand at node k in period t (MW). 
klZ   
Impedance magnitude for the line connecting nodes k and l (Ω). 
klP   Maximum active power limit in the line connecting nodes k and l (MW). 
kV   
Minimum voltage magnitude limit at node k (V). 
kV   
Maximum voltage magnitude limit at node k (V). 
sbP   
Minimum active power limit at the substation in period t (MW). 
sbP   
Maximum active power limit at the substation in period t (MW). 
idg
P
  
Minimum active power limit of DG unit i (MW). 
idgP   
Maximum active power limit of DG unit i (MW). 
ic   
Production cost of DG unit i (€/MWh). 
( )t  
Energy price at the substation in period t (€/MWh). 
C. Variables 
i   Contract price of DG unit i (€/MWh). 
Xi Decision variable of DGi  
( )
idg
P t
  
Active power generated by DG unit i in period t (MW). 
( )sbP t   
Active power purchased at the substation in period t (MW). 
( )gkP t  Active power injection in node k in period t (MW). 
( )kV t   
Voltage magnitude at node k in period t (V). 
( )k t   
Dual variable related to the power balance constraint at node k in period t. 
( )kl t   
Dual variable for maximum flow constraint of line connecting nodes k and l in at t. 
( )
kl
t
  
Dual variable for minimum flow constraint of line connecting nodes k and l in period t. 
( )
v
k t   
Dual variable related to the constraint on maximum level of 𝑉𝑘(𝑡) . 
( )
v
k
t
  
Dual variable related to the constraint on minimum level of 𝑉𝑘(𝑡). 
( )sb t   Dual variable related to the constraint on  maximum level of 
( )sbP t . 
( )
sb
t
  Dual variable related to the constraint on  minimum level of 
( )sbP t . 
( )
dg
i t   Dual variable related to the constraint on  maximum level of 
( )
idg
P t
. 
( )
dg
i
t
 Dual variable related to the constraint of  minimum level of 
( )
idg
P t
. 
D. Symbols 
a b   Complementarity condition between 𝑎 and 𝑏. 
E. Vectors 
w  Vector consists of variables Pdg, Psb and V. 
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Λ Dual variables of the equality constraints in DisCo optimization problem. 
y1 Vector consists of w and λ. 
Μ Dual variables for the inequality constraints in DisCo optimization problem 
ℎ𝑒  All the equality constraints in DGi optimization problem. 
?̅?𝑖  Complementarity variables for ℎ𝑒 in DGi optimization problem. 
hin All the inequality constraints in DGi optimization problem. 
μi Complementarity variables corresponding to hin in DGi problem. 
𝜓𝒊 Complementarity variables for−𝜇𝑠 ≥ 0  constraints in DGi optimization problem. 
𝜎𝑖, Complementarity variables for 𝑠 ≥ 0 constraints in DGi optimization problem. 
𝜙𝑖 Complementarity variables for 𝜇 ≥ 0 constraint in DGi optimization problem. 
F. Others 
f𝐷𝑖𝑠𝐶𝑜 Objective function of DisCo 
f𝑖 Objective function of DGi 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, there has been a growing trend toward Distributed Generation (DG) application in 
the distribution networks. DG has received great interests due to its potential benefits to both owner and 
power system such as energy revenue, energy loss reduction, voltage profile enhancement and deferral 
of distribution network expansion [1-2]. Restructuring in the electrical industry, technology advance-
ment as well as environmental concerns have also caused DG to be even more attractive. 
One important goal in power system restructuring is to provide the opportunity for independent com-
mercial entities to participate in power generation or electricity distribution. So, independent Distribu-
tion Company (DisCo) and DG units can be found in a deregulated environment in which each entity 
tries to optimize its own objective. 
To supply the demand of customers, DisCo purchases energy from the electricity market or through 
bilateral contracts with generation companies. Electric energy is injected to the distribution network 
through the sub-transmission substations. Although in most cases, DG units cannot compete with power 
plants, they can participate in providing energy for the distribution networks. Therefore, DisCo might 
opt to purchase energy from DG units located in the distribution network as well. Since the potential 
benefit of DG for the distribution network depends largely on the DG location, size and generation, var-
ious studies have been reported to determine the optimal size and place of DG units [3-5]. A comprehen-
sive study on optimal DG placement was conducted in [6] and [7]. Reference [8] quantified DG benefits 
to DisCo and the electricity market and proposed a method to reward DG units according to their bene-
fits. 
As there might be conflict of interest between DisCo and DG units, appropriate approach is needed to 
determine a proper price for energy generated by DGs in the distribution networks. The nodal pricing for 
DG is formulated as the least-cost dispatch problem in [9]. Reference [10] has used locational marginal 
price (LMP) approach for DG pricing considering load uncertainties. Some related works in this area are 
available in [11]. DG generation pricing when DG is owned by DisCo has been studied in [12].  Role of 
retailer-owned DG unit to improve the profit of the retailer has been discussed in [13]. Most available 
studies have been developed from DisCo standpoint and have focused to maximize the DG benefit to 
DisCo.  
To the authors’ knowledge, few recent studies have simultaneously considered the interests of both Dis-
Co and DG units as independent entities. Game theory provides a conceptual framework to address the 
problems in which the interest of more than one entity (player) is to be considered. In [14], optimal DG 
location and contract pricing is determined. A bilevel optimization method has been used in [15] to find 
the DG optimal contract price for DisCos to dispatch DG resources. In these works, the total profits of 
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DGs belonging to one DG owner are maximized while the DisCo payment is minimized using a mathe-
matical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Using an iteration method, [16] determined the 
optimal contract pricing for one private DG owner.  However, the methods presented in [14-16] are lim-
ited to consider the competition between DisCo and a single DG owner, forming a two-player game, and 
the methods  are not applicable to the cases where there are more than two players compete in the distri-
bution network.  
The competition can get more sophisticated as two or more than two independent DG units or electricity 
supplier/retailer participate in DisCo supply basket. On the other side, one of most convenient electricity 
businesses is investment in DG units. More and more DG units are expected to be installed in the distri-
bution networks making a competitive environment between DG owners.  A framework is, therefore, 
needed to determine optimal DG contract price taking into account the competition among independent 
DG owners in the distribution network. 
 In this paper, a framework is proposed for optimal contract pricing of competing dispatchable DG units 
in the distribution system. A multi-leader follower game theory concept is used in which the DG units 
are considered as leaders and DisCo is follower. DG objective is to maximize the electricity generation 
profit while the DisCo objective is to minimize the electricity supply cost. DG units give the price offer 
to DisCo and DisCo determines the amount of energy which should be purchased from the wholesale 
electricity market and DG units for the different periods of the contract between DisCo and DG units.  
The problem is formulated as a bi-level optimization problem in which each DG optimization problem 
forms the upper-level problem that should be solved subjected to the lower-level problem. DisCo prob-
lem, on the other hand, is considered as the lower-level problem which is represented as an optimal 
power flow problem. For each DG, in such setting, a mathematical program with equilibrium constraint 
(MPEC) is obtained. By combining the optimality conditions of problems of all DG units, an equilibri-
um problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) is formed. The EPEC is then reformulated as a nonlin-
ear programming (NLP) model using an NLP method. The proposed framework has been applied to the 
3-bus and Modified IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Test System and the performance of the proposed frame-
work has been evaluated.  
In their previous work [17], the authors have presented a diagonalisation technique to determine DG 
optimal contract price considering DG units competition. However, the diagonalization technique is 
time-consuming and faces cycling even for the small 6-bus test system used in [17] and is not applicable 
for practical cases. In the present paper, we extended our previous work to be applicable in practical 
cases. Proposed NLP formulation can solve all DG problems simultaneously without facing cycling. 
Insightful and interesting case studies are presented in this work. The importance of the competition is 
also presented in detail. We also compared our work with the pervious related research [15], [16] and 
the optimality of the results were tested using two techniques. 
Main contributions of this paper are: 
1) It presents a mathematical NLP model for obtaining optimal contract pricing of non-utility dispatcha-
ble DG units in the distribution system. 
2) It explicitly models and quantifies the impact of the DG interaction on the solution using a game 
theoretic approach and a multi-period bilevel optimization model. 
3) The reaction of DisCo to the energy contract prices offered by independent DG units is explicitly 
accounted for. 
 
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of the problem, and the problem 
formulation.  Solution method is presented for a simple distribution system in Section 3. Case studies 
are presented and discussed in Section 4. Optimality evaluation and computational issues are evaluated 
in Section 5. Practical implications of the proposed framework are discussed in Section 6 and the con-
cluding remarks are provided in Section 7. 
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2 MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
2.1 Basic Assumptions  
It is assumed that the distribution system is operated by a single DisCo. The distribution system is con-
nected to the subtransmission substatiuon. Independent investor-owned DG units are assumed to be in-
stalled in the distribution system which are based on dispatchable technology. DisCo can provide the 
electricity from the wholesale market or through bilateral contracts with DG units. A market structure 
similar to the ones presented in [14-17] is considered in which DisCo is to provide costumers’ demand 
at minimum operation cost and power loss.  
DG units compete to increase their profit by increasing the amount or price of the generation contracted 
with DisCo. On the other hand, DisCo takes benefits from DG generation to improve the voltage profile, 
reduce power loss and supply the demand.  The proposed multi-leader follower game-theory framework 
to model the competition among DG units and DisCo is presented in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of the Proposed Framework. 
 
It can be seen in Fig. 1 that, in the proposed framework, first, independent DG units anticipate the DisCo 
reaction and compete with each other. They playing a Nash game to offer their own contract prices and 
available capacities to DisCo. Then DisCo determines the quantity of energy which should be purchased 
from DG units and electricity market by minimizing total DisCo cost, considering the network con-
straints. 
From the regularity point of view, the proposed framework is appropriate for any electricity market in 
which power loss are assumed by the DisCo. This is the case of most countries with deregulated electric-
ity markets, such as U.K., in which incentive mechanisms imposed by the regulator force Discos to re-
duce (or assume) power losses. In most power market, such as Iran Power Market [18], DisCo takes 
both technical and financial responsibilities for distribution system operation and also for buying the 
electricity directly from the DG units [19]. 
To determine the amount of energy to be purchased from each supplier, DisCo must weigh not only the 
energy prices, but also it must consider the impact of the supplied energy on the distribution network 
including loss reduction and voltage profile improvement. We take into account these two aspects by 
means of an approximate power flow model as in [20] in which the active power flow between node k 
and l is approximated as follows: 
 -
.
V V
k lP
kl k
l
V
Z
k

 
(1) 
2.2 Bilevel Model  
The problem of each DG unit can be formulated as a bilevel problem considering two decision makers 
referred to as leader and follower that will try to optimize their individual objective functions. The DG, 
in the upper level, offers the contract price to the DisCo over a specified time period so as to maximize 
its own profit. The DisCo, in the lower level, minimizes total energy supply cost and determines the 
power purchased from DG. 
The problem faced by each DG unit can be formulated as the following bilevel problem:  
   Max c P ti i dg
t T ii




 
(2) 
Subject to:  
   
, ,
 ( )Min  
V P P
dg sb
i
t P t P t
sb i dg
it T t T i I
   
  
 
(3) 
Subject to:  
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     
      
0 : ,;( ) ;
V t V t V t
k k lP t P t t k K t T
gk dk kZl L klk


       

 (4) 
      
: ( ) ) ;, ( ; ,
t t V t
k k lP P t t k K t Tkl kl kl kl
k
V V
l
Z
 

        (5) 
( ) : ( ), ( ); , ;
v v
V V t V t t k K t Tk kk kk
     
 
(6) 
( ) : ( ), ( ); ;P t P t t t Tsbsb sb bsb
P s      
(7) 
  : ( ), ( ); , .
dg dg
P t P t t t T i Idgdg i idg
P
ii i
        (8) 
In which: 
Equation (2) represents DG objective function; 
Equation (3) reflects DisCo objective function; 
Equation (4) represents bus power balance; 
Equation (5) represents distribution line flow limit; 
Equation (6) gives bus voltage limit; 
Equation (7) represents the limit on the subtransmission substation power; 
Equation (8) gives the limit on different DGs’ generations. 
Note that in equations (4) to (8) and for most of constraint equations in this paper, the dual variable as-
sociated with the equation is mentioned after “:” symbol and the complementary variable associated 
with each equation is mentioned after “⊥” symbol.  
The set of equations (3)-(8) form the lower level problem, i.e. DisCo problem. DisCo objective function 
comprises of two terms: the cost of power purchased from the market at a price of β(t); and the cost of 
energy purchased from all DG units at their contract prices. Equation (2) forms the upper level problem 
that represents DG objective function. The upper level problem determines the optimal contract pricing 
of each DG unit over the contract period whereas the dispatch level of DG and wholesale market pur-
chases result from the solution of the lower level problem. Using the KKT conditions of the lower level, 
each DG problem can be cast as follow:  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑖,𝑣𝑘,𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖 ,𝑃𝑠𝑏
 ∑(𝛼𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖(𝑡)
𝑡∈𝑇
 (9) 
Subject to:  
∇𝑣𝑘(𝑡)→ (−𝜆𝑘(𝑡)+?̅?𝑘𝑙(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑘𝑙(𝑡))∑
(2𝑣𝑘(𝑡)−𝑣𝑙(𝑡))
𝑧kl
+ μ̅k
v(t) − μk
v(t)𝑙∈𝐿 = 0;∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (10) 
∇𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖(𝑡)
→  𝛼𝑖+𝜆𝑘(𝑡) + μ̅i
dg(t) − μi
dg
(t)=0; ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼;  (11) 
∇𝑃𝑠𝑏(𝑡)→  𝛽(𝑡)+𝜆𝑘(𝑡) + ?̅?𝑠𝑏(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑠𝑏(𝑡) = 0; ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (12) 
−𝑃𝑔𝑘(𝑡) + 𝑃𝑑𝑘(𝑡) + ∑
𝑣𝑘(𝑡)(𝑣𝑘(𝑡)−𝑣𝑙(𝑡))
𝑧kl
𝑙∈𝐿 = 0; ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (13) 
∑
𝑣𝑘(𝑡)(𝑣𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑣𝑙(𝑡))
𝑧kl
𝑙∈𝐿
+ ?̅?𝑘𝑙 ≥ 0 ⊥  𝜇𝑘𝑙(𝑡) ≥ 0; ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (14) 
−∑
𝑣𝑘(𝑡)(𝑣𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑣𝑙(𝑡))
𝑧kl
+
𝑙∈𝐿
?̅?𝑘𝑙 ≥ 0 ⊥  ?̅?𝑘𝑙(𝑡) ≥ 0; ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (15) 
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𝑣𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑣𝑘 ≥ 0 ⊥ μk
v(t) ≥ 0;∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (16) 
−𝑣𝑘(𝑡) + ?̅?𝑘 ≥ 0 ⊥ μ̅k
v(t) ≥ 0;∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (17) 
𝑃𝑠𝑏(𝑡) − 𝑃𝑠𝑏 ≥ 0 ⊥ 𝜇𝑠𝑏(𝑡) ≥ 0;∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (18) 
−𝑃𝑠𝑏(𝑡) + ?̅?𝑠𝑏 ≥ 0 ⊥ ?̅?𝑠𝑏(𝑡) ≥ 0;∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇; (19) 
𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖 ≥ 0 ⊥ μi
dg
(t) ≥ 0; ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼; (20) 
−𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖(𝑡) + ?̅?𝑑𝑔𝑖 ≥ 0 ⊥ μ̅i
dg
(t) ≥ 0; ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼; (21) 
𝜆𝑘(𝑡) free. (22) 
 
The set of equation (9)-(22) represents a mathematical program with equilibrium constraint (MPEC) 
associated with each DG unit. There are as many MPEC as the number of DG units in the system.  
2.3   The compact Form 
To represent a step-by step of the proposed framework, and for the sake of the simplicity, the formula-
tions are first rewritten in a compact form, where subscripts and time index are discarded.  
First, the lower level problem is replaced by its KKT conditions. Note that the lower level problem re-
fers to the Disco optimization problem i.e. (3)-(8). The compact form is presented as follows: 
 Min f
DisCo
x,w  (23) 
subject to
 
 
𝐸𝑞(𝑤) = 0 ∶ 𝜆 (24) 
0 ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞(𝑤) ∶ 𝜇 ≥ 0 (25) 
where the equality and inequality constraints are denoted as Eq and Ineq.  
Notice that the constraints related to DisCo problem are Eq and Ineq. It should be remembered that the 
notation in (24) and (25) just show that λ and  μ are the dual variables of these constraints.  
The vector x and w include all decision variables of each independent DG unit and the DisCo such that 
w = (Pdg, Psb, V) and Xi=(𝛼𝑖). The compact form of the KKT conditions is: 
∇𝑤f𝐷𝑖𝑠𝐶𝑜(𝑥, 𝑤) − ∇𝑤
𝑇 𝐸𝑞(𝑤) ∗ (𝜆) − ∇𝑤
𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞(𝑤) ∗ (𝜇) = 0 (26) 
  0Eq w  (27) 
 0  0Ineq  w μ  (28) 
 sign-free.λ  (29) 
Note that the decision variables of independent DG units are considered as parameters in the Disco prob-
lem. Assuming that y1= (w, λ) and the following functions: 
ℎ𝑒(𝑥, 𝜇, 𝑦1) = {
∇𝑤f𝐷𝑖𝑠𝐶𝑜(𝑥, 𝑦1) − ∇𝑤
𝑇 𝐸𝑞(𝑦1) ∗ (𝜆) − ∇𝑤
𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞(𝑦1) ∗ (𝜇)
𝐸𝑞(𝑤)
} = 0 (30) 
     0.h Ineqin  y w1  (31) 
By adding slack variables to (31), expressions (26)-(29) can be rewritten as: 
  01he x,μ,y  (32) 
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  0inh  1y s  (33) 
0 0.  s μ
 (34) 
Note that expressions (32)-(34) is the appropriate form of the formulations (23)-(25) and so they can be 
substituted in each DG optimization problem instead of (23)-(25).  
 
For the independent DG i, other independent DGs decisions are expressed by 𝑥−𝑖. Therefore, each DG 
problem ((2)-(8)) can be written as follows: 
(
 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥        𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦1)
𝑠. 𝑡 
      ℎ𝑒(𝑥𝑖, 𝜇, 𝑦1; 𝑥−𝑖) = 0    
   ℎ𝑖𝑛(𝑦1) − 𝑠 = 0    
           0 ≤ 𝑠 ⊥  𝜇 ≥ 0           )
 
 
 (35) 
 
Each DG problem is an MPEC because there are Disco complementarity constraints into their problems. 
This means that each DG anticipates how the Disco will react to its contract price offer. Considering all 
the MPEC associated to the DG units, the problem becomes an EPEC which is solved as expressed in 
the next section. 
3 THE SOLUTION METHOD  
3.1 NLP Formulation 
 
The one attractive way to solve EPEC problem is to declare it as an NLP formulation and then use 
commercially available software like GAMS to solve the problem. The NLP formulation we used is 
similar to the one presented in [21]. Given the formulation (35) for all DG units and that the comple-
mentarity conditions 0 ≤ 𝑠 ⊥ 𝜇 ≥ 0 can be reformulated in a nonlinear form −𝜇Ts≥ 0, 𝜇,s≥ 0 ,each DG 
problem can be reformulated as a nonlinear form: 
 
(
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥        𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦1)
𝑠. 𝑡 
      ℎ𝑒(𝑥𝑖, 𝜇, 𝑦1; 𝑥−𝑖) = 0   ∶  ?̅?𝑖
   ℎ𝑖𝑛(𝑦1) − 𝑠 = 0        ∶  𝜇𝑖
 −𝜇𝑠 ≥ 0                       ∶  𝜙𝑖
      𝑠 ≥ 0                        ∶  𝜎𝑖  
    𝜇 ≥ 0                        ∶  𝜓𝑖 )
 
 
 
 
 
 (36) 
 
Then, each MPEC (optimization problem (36)) is replaced by its strong stationarity conditions (which is 
equivalent to its KKT conditions). Therefore the optimization problem of DGi (optimization problem 
(36)) can be represented as follow: 
−∇𝑥𝑖𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝑥𝑖
𝑇 ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 = 0; (37) 
−∇𝜇𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝜇
𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑛𝜇𝑖 − ∇𝜇
𝑇ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 + 𝑠𝜙𝑖 − 𝜓𝑖 = 0 ; (38) 
−∇𝑦1𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝑦1
𝑇 ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 − ∇𝑦1
𝑇 ℎ𝑖𝑛𝜇𝑖 = 0;  (39) 
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝜙𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖 = 0;   (40) 
ℎ𝑒(𝑥, 𝜇, 𝑦1) = 0;     (41) 
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ℎ𝑖𝑛(𝑦1) − 𝑠 = 0;    (42) 
−𝜇𝑠 ≥ 0  ⊥  𝜙𝑖 (43) 
𝑠 ≥ 0       ⊥  𝜎𝑖 (44) 
𝜇 ≥ 0        ⊥  𝜓𝑖 (45) 
The complementarity conditions of (36) are expressed as follows: 
(
 𝑠 ≥ 0 ⊥  𝜇 ≥ 0
 𝜇 ≥   ⊥  𝜓𝑖 ≥ 0
     𝑠 ≥ 0   ⊥  𝜎𝑖 ≥ 0
  𝜙𝑖 ≥ 0
)  (46) 
 
The NLP formulation problem (36) is derived by replacing the complementarity constraints in (37)-(46)  
by the equivalent nonlinear form.  
As several independent DGs are participated in the Disco supply basket, the complete NLP formulation 
of the problem is thus obtained by combining all the strong stationarity conditions of each DG units as 
(47)-(55). Note that the NLP formulation aims to provide a feasible solution for (36) by minimizing the 
complementarity constraints. For this purpose, first all the complementarity constraints are substituted 
by −aTb≥ 0, a,b≥ 0, then the objective function is defined as a minimization of all the aTb [21]. This 
formulation can be written as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑(𝜎𝑖
𝑇𝑠 + 𝜓𝑖
𝑇𝜇) + 𝜇𝑇𝑠
𝑖
 
(47) 
Subject to:  
−∇𝑥𝑖𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝑥𝑖
𝑇 ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 = 0,∀i ∈ I ; (48) 
−∇𝜇𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝜇
𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑛𝜇𝑖 − ∇𝜇
𝑇ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 + 𝑠𝜙𝑖 − 𝜓𝑖 = 0 , ∀i ∈ I; (49) 
−∇𝑦1𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝑦1
𝑇 ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 − ∇𝑦1
𝑇 ℎ𝑖𝑛𝜇𝑖 = 0, ∀i ∈ I;  (50) 
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝜙𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖 = 0, ∀i ∈ I;   (51) 
ℎ𝑒(𝑥, 𝜇, 𝑦1) = 0;     (52) 
ℎ𝑖𝑛(𝑦1) − 𝑠 = 0;    (53) 
 𝜓𝑖,𝜎𝑖, 𝜙𝑖 ≥ 0;   (54) 
𝑥, 𝜇, 𝑠 ≥ 0; (55) 
Note that lower-level problem is nonconvex and hence, the KKT conditions are not sufficient for guar-
anteeing the optimality of the solution. The NLP formulation (47)–(55) aims to provide a feasible solu-
tion by leading complementarity conditions to zero while enforcing all the original system constraints. 
Since the equilibrium conditions are nonconvex, any solution set with Cpen=0 has to be tested to ensure 
it corresponds to a local maximum (see also [22, 23]). 
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To verify the optimality of solution, two different techniques are available. The first technique is to use 
the diagonalization technique which itself is based on the Gauss-Seidel method. However, the diagonali-
sation technique does not proof that the solution is optimal.  
The second technique, however, definitely guarantees that the lower level decision variables are optimal. 
In the second technique, the DisCo problem is solved based on EPEC results. In such technique, all con-
tract prices obtained by NLP formulation are put into the DisCo optimization problem. Then DisCo op-
timization problem is implemented by NLP solvers. In this way all the decision variables of DisCo such 
as the amount of energy which should be purchased from DGs and wholesale electricity market are ob-
tained. The profits of DGs are also calculated.  
If the decision variables of DisCo are the same as the ones obtained by NLP formulation, then the profits 
of DGs will be the same and the EPEC solution is optimal. Both techniques have been used in this paper 
to check the optimality of EPEC solution. 
3.2 Simple example 
This section extensively discusses the application of the proposed framework to a simple study. In par-
ticular, all DG and DisCo variables and constraints as well as associated dual and complementarity vari-
ables have been expressed. NLP formulation and the associated variables and constraints have been 
demonstrated for the simple study to comprehensively understand the proposed framework and the asso-
ciated variables and constraints. 
A 3-Bus test system, presented in Fig. 2, was used as a simple example in this section to clearly demon-
strate how the proposed method works. The data associated with the 3-Bus test system is provided in the 
Appendix. SE in Fig. 2 refers to the substation through which the energy purchased by DisCo flows into 
the network.  It is assumed that two DG units, DG1 and DG2, was installed on bus 2 and bus 3, respec-
tively.  
 
Figure 2: 3-Bus Distribution Test System. 
The DisCo problem formulation and associated KKT conditions are represented in (3)-(8) and (10)-(22), 
receptively. As stated previously, KKT conditions are inserted in each DG problem producing an 
MPEC.  
Now, we aim to present how NLP formulation is constructed by combining the optimization problem of 
all DG units. First, considering the MPEC formulation (9)-(22), the slack variable s, from the set of S, is 
added to its corresponding inequality constraint. For the sake of simplicity, the time index and the line 
flow constraints are removed we only consider the problem for one time period. Therefore, the MPEC 
problem for DG1 is presented as follow: 
For DG1, the objective function is: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥  (𝛼1 − 𝑐1)𝑃𝑑𝑔1 (56) 
The DisCo problem formulation is represented in (3)-(8). KKT conditions associated with DisCo prob-
lem are represented in (10)-(22) which are inserted in DG1 problem as follows: 
∇𝑣𝑘→ (−𝜆𝑘+?̅?𝑘𝑙 − 𝜇𝑘𝑙)∑
(2𝑣𝑘−𝑣𝑙)
𝑧kl
+ μ̅k
v − μk
v
𝑙∈𝐿 = 0;           ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 = {1,2,3}; (57) 
∇𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖
→  𝛼𝑖+𝜆𝑘 + μ̅i
dg
− μi
dg
=0;        , ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, 2};  (58) 
∇𝑃𝑠𝑏→  𝛽+𝜆𝑘 + ?̅?𝑠𝑏 − 𝜇𝑠𝑏 = 0; (59) 
It should be remembered that, as shown in equations (5) to (8),  μ̅1
v, μ̅2
v, μ̅3
v, μ1
v, μ2
v, μ3
v are the complemen-
tary variables associated with the bus voltage limits,𝜇𝑠𝑏 , ?̅?𝑠𝑏 are those associated with DisCo power pur-
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chase limit at the substation and  μ̅1
dg
, μ̅2
dg
, μ1
dg
, μ2
dg
 are the complementary variables associated with the 
DG generation limits. 
Bus power flow constraint for the system is presented as:  
−𝑃𝑔𝑘 + 𝑃𝑑𝑘 + ∑
𝑣𝑘(𝑣𝑘−𝑣𝑙)
𝑧kl
𝑙∈𝐿 = 0;      ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 = {1,2,3}; (60) 
Inequality constraints, equations (5) to (8) are turned into the equality constraints by adding 12-variable 
slack vector S: 
?̅?𝑘− 𝑣𝑘− 𝑠𝑘′ = 0  ; ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 = {1,2,3};∀𝑘
′ ∈ 𝐾′ = {1,2,3}, 𝐾′ ⊂ 𝑆; (61) 
 𝑣𝑘 − 𝑣𝑘− 𝑠𝑘′′ = 0 ; ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾; ∀𝑘
′′ ∈ 𝐾′′ = {4,5,6}, 𝐾′′ ⊂ 𝑆; (62) 
?̅?𝑑𝑔𝑖−𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖 −  𝑠𝑘′′′ = 0 ; ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 = {1,2}, ∀𝑘
′′′ ∈ 𝐾′′′ = {7,8}, 𝐾′′′ ⊂ 𝑆; (63) 
𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖 − 𝑃𝑑𝑔𝑖− 𝑠𝑘′′′′ = 0 ; ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 = {1,2}, ∀𝑘
′′′′ ∈ 𝐾′′′′ = {9,10},𝐾′′′′ ⊂ 𝑆; (64) 
𝑃𝑠𝑏(𝑡) − 𝑃𝑠𝑏− 𝑠𝑘′′′′′ = 0 ; ∀𝑘
′′′′′ ∈ 𝐾′′′′′ = {11},𝐾′′′′′ ⊂ 𝑆; (65) 
−𝑃𝑠𝑏(𝑡) + ?̅?𝑠𝑏− 𝑠𝑘′′′′′′ = 0 ; ∀𝑘
′′′′′′ ∈ 𝐾′′′′′′ = {12},𝐾′′′′′′ ⊂ 𝑆; (66) 
For the sake of simplicity, μ̅1
v, μ̅2
v, μ̅3
v, μ1
v, μ2
v, μ3
v, 𝜇𝑠𝑏 , ?̅?𝑠𝑏 , μ̅1
dg
, μ̅2
dg
, μ1
dg
, μ2
dg
 was substituted by 
 𝜇1,  𝜇2,  𝜇3,  𝜇4,  𝜇5,  𝜇6,  𝜇7,  𝜇8,  𝜇9,  𝜇10,  𝜇11,  𝜇12 , respectively. Therefore we have the following con-
straints: 
−𝜇𝑠 ≥ 0                        ;   {𝜇1…  𝜇12} , S={ 𝑠1. . .  𝑠12} (67) 
−𝑠 ≥ 0                                                  (68) 
𝜇 ≥ 0                          (69) 
The objective function (56) subjected to the set of equations (57)-(69) forms the MPEC associated with 
DG1. A set of equations similar to (56)-(69) can also be derived to form MPEC problem associated with 
DG2. 
As stated in the previous section, DG1 and DG2 problems are turned into the strong stationarity condi-
tions. Combining the strong stationarity conditions, NLP formulation is developed as follows:  
The objective function for NLP formulation is presented in (70). The aim of objective function is to push 
the sum of the product of all complementarity variables into zero. Variables ψi,σi, ϕiare the vectors for 
the associated constraints (67)-(69) for each DG unit. 
𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑(𝜎𝑖
𝑇𝑠 + 𝜓𝑖
𝑇𝜇) + 𝜇𝑇𝑠
𝑖
 (70) 
Equation (71) represents derivatives of DG decision variable, i.e. contract price (αi).  
−∇𝛼𝑖𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝛼𝑖
𝑇 ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 = 0, ∀i ∈ I = {1, 2};  (71) 
In (71), fi represents DGi objective function and he represents all the equality constraints in MPEC asso-
ciated with DGi i.e. (57)-(60). Variable μ̅i in (71) is the complementarity variable associated with  he. 
Derivative of μ are presented in (72) in which hin represents all the inequality constraints in MPEC as-
sociated with DGi as presented in (61)-(69). ) μi is the complementarity variable corresponding to hin.  
−∇𝜇𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝜇
𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑛𝜇𝑖 − ∇𝜇
𝑇ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 + 𝑠𝜙𝑖 − 𝜓𝑖 = 0 , ∀i ∈ I;  (72) 
12 
 
 
Derivatives of MPEC associated with DG units to y1 is presented in (73) in which y1 is a vector consists 
of Psb, Pdg1 , Pdg2 and also vkand  λk vectors. 
−∇𝑦1𝑓𝑖 − ∇𝑦1
𝑇 ℎ𝑒?̅?𝑖 − ∇𝑦1
𝑇 ℎ𝑖𝑛𝜇𝑖 = 0, ∀i ∈ I;  (73) 
Set of equation (74) represents the derivative of S={s1, …, s12} for each DG problem. 
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝜙𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖 = 0, ∀i ∈ I;   (74) 
Constraints on he and hin and the problem variables have been presented in (75)-(78) in which 𝑥 is the 
vector of decisions variables for DG units, i.e. (𝛼1, 𝛼2). 
ℎ𝑒(𝑥, 𝜇, 𝑦1) = 0;     (75) 
ℎ𝑖𝑛(𝑦1) − 𝑠 = 0;   (76) 
 𝜓𝑖 ,𝜎𝑖 , 𝜙𝑖 ≥ 0;   (77) 
𝑥, 𝜇, 𝑠 ≥ 0; (78) 
The formulations (70)-(78) refers to the proposed NLP formulation for EPEC problem which can be 
solved by NLP solver. If the objective functions become zero then the feasible solution is attained.  
The proposed framework was applied to the 3-Bus system. For the sake of simplicity, it was assumed 
that DisCo can purchase the electricity from a retailer at the fixed price of 60 €/MWh. Note that the re-
tailer price is equal to the DG production cost. Moreover, the system demand is 6 MW which is equally 
distributed in the system buses and the demand is constant all over the year. Without DG application, 
system loss is 0.057 MW and DisCo should purchase the system demand as well as system loss, i.e. 
6.057 MW, from the retailer. 
Two 1MW DG units, DG1 and DG2, have been located in Bus 2 and Bus 3, respectively. The proposed 
framework has been applied to determine contract price and power of DG units for a yearly electricity 
purchase contract between DisCo and DG units. Optimal contract price for DG1 and DG2 has been ob-
tained as 60.68 and 61.01 €/MWh, respectively and the contracted power for each DG unit is 1 MW, 
meaning that DG units are fully contracted. So, competition among DG units has led to different con-
tract prices for DG units.  
Table 1 shows the DisCo payment and energy loss with and without DG application. 
Table 1: Competition Results for Simple Example 
 
It can be seen in Table 1 that, even for a simple case, the competition among DG units has led to de-
crease in total DisCo payment. 
The computation details are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Computation Details for Simple Example 
4 NUMERICAL RESULTS 
The proposed model has been applied to the modified IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Test System [14], pre-
sented in Fig. 3. The additional information used in this paper for the IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Test 
System is provided in Table 10 in Appendix. 
 
Figure 3: IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Test System [15]. 
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Total system load has been scaled such that the maximum system load is 10 MW. The annual load dura-
tion curve of the system is assumed to be composed of five equal periods each cover 20 percent of the 
year as the one shown in Fig. 4.  
For each of the five load periods, the wholesale energy market prices in €/MWh at the substation (bus 1) 
are given in Fig. 4. It can be seen in Fig. 4 that market price in 40 percents of the time is not less than 70 
€/MWh. 
 
Figure 4: Annual System Load Duration Curve and Market Price. 
 
Four dispatchable DG units each with a capacity of 1 MW was assumed denoted as DG1, DG2, DG3 
and DG4. The production cost of all DG units was assumed similar and equals to 60 €/MWh. The reason 
for assuming similar production cost for all DG units is that the current paper is aimed to evaluate the 
effect of competition and location on DG contract pricing problem. If DG units have identical produc-
tion cost, the impact of competition on the contract price of DG units can be easily identified through 
analyzing the difference in the profit of DG units. 
The proposed framework has been applied to the Modified IEEE 34-Bus test system to determine a fixed 
one-year optimal DG contract price. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the load at each period 
is equally divided among the nodes. All simulations were carried out on a laptop computer with a 1.1 
GHz processor and 4 GB of RAM memory. The proposed framework was implemented in GAMS envi-
ronment and solved using IPOPT solver. 
Two scenarios have been studied:  
 Scenario A: only two DG units are considered. 
 Scenario B: The number of DG units increased to four. 
Several cases are simulated as presented next. 
4.1 Scenario A 
In this scenario, DG1 was located in bus 17 and DG2 was applied in bus 24. Two cases have been stud-
ied for Scenario A:  
 Case 1: This case represents the base case.  
 Case 2: This case maintains the conditions in Case 1 and further assumes the production cost of 
DG1 increased to 70 €/MWh. 
The proposed framework has been applied and the results were given in Table 3 where the optimal con-
tract price, annual energy produced by DG and their profits are presented. Note that the contract price is 
fixed during the year. 
Table 3: Results of Scenario A. 
Regarding the contracted DG power, it was observed that, for cases 1, both DG1 and DG2 sell the rated 
power (1 MW) to DisCo during 40 percent of the time when the market price is higher than 62 €/MWh 
and the contracted power is zero in other times. This shows that DisCo take advantage of DG generation 
in high market price periods. 
It can be seen in Table 3 that for Case 1, contract price of DG units is well above the DG generation 
cost. In particular, DG2 has higher profit in both cases and the DisCo purchases the energy from DG2 at 
a higher price. This is because DG2 is located at a farther bus w.r.t the substation and can reduce energy 
loss more effectively.  
By increasing the production cost of DG1 in Case 2, it is observed that DG1 sells the energy at a higher 
price than in Case 1. However, as DG1 increased the contract price, DisCo reacted to this action and 
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decreased the amount of energy purchased from DG1 to 1752MWh. Therefore, the profit of DG1 de-
creased. It is interesting to note that DG2 also changes the contract price to the higher level in Case 2 
compared to Case 1. As it is seen in Table 2, the profit of DG2 increases by 13.34% in Case 2 compared 
to Case 1 as a response to increase in the production cost of DG1 in Case 2. This shows that the pro-
posed framework can consider the benefits of each player properly so that the interaction between com-
peting DG units can be correctly studied. 
Table 4 shows the DisCo payment and annual energy losses with and without DG units.  
Table 4: Outcomes in Scenario A. 
It can be seen in Table 4 that, by dispatching DGs, DisCo cost and annual energy loss were reduced by 
1.83% and 31.39% , respectively, in Case 1 and 0.98% and 26.14% in Case 2 compared to the case 
where no DG unit was used. It can also be seen in Table 3 that DisCo energy purchase at higher market 
prices was also reduced when DG used.  
So, DG application is beneficial to DisCo and resulted to reduction in DisCo payment. On the other 
hand, DisCo purchases the energy from DG units at a price higher that DG production cost. It can be 
interpreted that DisCo shared a part of benefit from DG application with DG units by setting DG con-
tract price higher than DG production cost. Competition among DG units has led to higher price for 
DG2 than DG1, as DG2 is more beneficial to DisCo than DG1.  
4.2 Scenario B 
To show the efficacy of the proposed framework, more than two DG units were considered in Scenario 
B. In this scenario, two cases were studied as described below. 
 Case 3: Three DG units were considered: DG1 at bus 17, DG2 at bus 24, and DG3 at bus 11. 
 Case 4: It maintains the condition in Case 3 and assumes that DG4 is located in bus 33. 
Case3 and Case 4 have been analyzed using the proposed framework. Table 5 presents the results. Con-
tracted DG generation was the same as those obtained for Case1 and Case 2 in Scenario A.  
Table 5: DG Results for Different Cases in Scenario B. 
It can be observed that profit of DG units has been decreased with penetration of more DG units. Com-
pared to Case 1, the profit of DG1 and DG2 decrease by 2.48% and 2.51% in Case 3, and by 5.42% and 
6.16% in Case 4. It also can be seen that DG2 has the highest contract price even when DG4 was in-
stalled on a farther bus. This is due to the fact that DG2 plays more important role in the power flow in 
the distribution network and it can receive higher contract price. So, it can be concluded that the DG 
contract price depends on DG usefulness for the DisCo rather than the DG distance from the substation. 
Comparing the results presented for Case 4 and Case 1, it is interesting to note that the profit of DG2 
reduced more than that of DG1 with the increase in the number of DG units. In this study, DG2 gains the 
highest profit while DG3 attains the lowest profit. DisCo Payments and losses are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Disco Results for Different Cases in Scenario B. 
As seen from Table 6, the DisCo payments decrease by 0.92% and 2.33% in Case 3 and Case 4 com-
pared to Case 1. Note that as the DG penetration level increases, the DisCo cost decreases accordingly.  
4.3 Impact of Competition  
In this section the impact of modelling the competition is investigated and its effect on the price and 
costs are examined.  
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A case was simulated referred to as OW1 which hold the same conditions given for Case 1.  However, 
we assumed that DG units belong to a single owner and do not compete with each other. The DG owner 
thus will try to maximize the profit defined below: 
   
i
ii i dg
i I t T
Max c p t


 
  (79) 
From formulation (79), it is seen that the DG owner tries to maximize the total profit equals to the sum-
mation of all DGs’ profits. However, in the proposed framework (see formulation (2)) each DG unit tries 
to maximize its own profit considering the action of other DGs and reaction of DisCo. It should be no-
ticed that with the above objective function and assumptions, an MPEC formulation is obtained to calcu-
late DG contract price as the model proposed in [14]- [16]. The resulting MPEC has been solved using 
the SNOPT solver in GAMS environment and the results have been obtained. Table 7 compares the 
results obtained for the case OW1 with that obtained in Part 4.1 for Case1.   
Table 7: Competition Impact Evaluation Results 
According to Table 7, compared to Case 1, the contract price and profit of DG2 increased in OW1 while 
the profit decreased for DG1. Results in Table 6 show that the difference between the profits of DG2 
and DG1 is 4,650 € in Case 1, while it increased to 22,128 € in OW1. In OW1, the DG owner’s objec-
tive is to attain the best profit and it would raise the price as it is the sole choice for the DisCo. As ex-
pected, the lower DisCo payments and energy loss take place in Case 1 instead of OW1. In fact, the 
competition among DG units in Case 1 has led to more benefits for the DisCo and it also causes to de-
crease the energy loss by 7.69%. Note that although the total profit of DG units in OW1 is higher than 
that in Case1, some DG units can gain more profit by deviating from their contract prices in OW1. For 
example, DG1 can increase its profit by 12.73% if it changes its contract price to the price calculated in 
Case1. 
Results obtained in this section showed that the competition among DG units permits the DisCo to min-
imize the cost. It also resulted in smaller energy loss and help increase energy efficiency. For instance, 
in Case 1, DG1 and DG2 are dispatched properly so that the DisCo payments and energy losses de-
creased and no player gains more profits by deviating from his contract price.  Moreover, DG2 as a 
player who has more positive impact on distribution network and energy losses gained more profits. 
Therefore, modelling the competition can capture the benefits of DG to the distribution network proper-
ly and bring more profit for DG2. In contrast, neglecting the competition may result in an unreasonable 
solution for the contract pricing problem. For example, as observed in OW1, DG1 has to reduce his 
profits in favour of DG2 for the sake of global optimality (formulation (79)). 
On the other hand, results presented in this section showed that the competition among DG unit must be 
correctly modelled to determine competitive contract price. Otherwise, the prices that are calculated by 
ignoring the competition will have a considerable drift with the correct competitive prices.  
5 OPTIMALITY EVALUATION 
As previously indicated, due to the nonconvexity of the lower level problem (3)-(8), the optimality of 
the solution should be verified. In this section, the problem is solved using two other techniques and the 
results are compared with those presented in Section 4 which are calculated using NLP technique. The 
techniques used to verify the results are called the diagonalisation technique and post-optimality test 
technique. 
Diagonalization technique is a technique to solve EPEC that has been widely used [23] and [24].  This 
technique was used and different starting points were tested to verify the optimality but only one Nash 
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point was found. It should be noted that the diagonalization techniques were implemented in GAMS 
environment and solved using the IPOPT solver.  In all cases, the solutions found by the NLP approach 
were very close to the solutions of the diagonalization method and differences were negligible. For in-
stance, the difference between the DG contract prices using these methods are around 10-4. The compu-
tational details of the proposed framework and diagonalization technique are presented in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Computation Details 
 
 
The accuracy in Table 8 is defined for NLP as the values of objective function (47). For the diagonaliza-
tion technique, accuracy is defined as the difference between DG contract prices in two consecutive 
iterations. Notice the large problem size and the longer computing time for the NLP approach. In the 
case of the diagonalization technique, two and three sweeps are needed to find the solution for Case 3 
and Case 4, respectively. Note that although the problem size and computing time were reduced in the 
diagonalization technique, cycling issue is the major drawback of this technique [25].  
 
In the diagonalisation technique, each DG problem will be solved separately, and by iteration and updat-
ing the decision variables of DG units the optimal solution will be obtained. That is why the number of 
variables, constraints, iteration and CPU second per problem in Table 8 is different from those associat-
ed with the complete problem. 
However, NLP technique considers all KKT conditions of DG problems simultaneously and only one 
optimization problem will be solved. It means the number of variables/constraints per problem in Table 
8 for the NLP formulation is equal to those associated with whole problem. This would be the same for 
CPU seconds/iteration per problem and total amount. 
Once the results have been verified using the diagonalization technique, the post-optimality test tech-
nique was also used. This technique is based on the Nash equilibrium definition which states that no 
player will be better paid off if it changes the strategy unilaterally.  
Remembering that DG units act as the players of the Nash game, the post-optimality test works as fol-
lows: First, all decision variables of the DG units are fixed at their optimal values obtained using the 
proposed framework and are substituted in the DisCo problem (3)-(8). Second, the contract price of one 
DG unit is changed around its neighbourhood and the DisCo problem is solved and the profit of DG 
units is calculated. If the profit of the DG unit with changed contract price is smaller than the one ob-
tained by the proposed framework, it means that the contract price calculated by the proposed frame-
work is optimal. This test is carried out for all DG units. Finally, if the optimality of the contract price of 
all DG units is assured, it indicates that the solution corresponds to an optimal point and is thus the Nash 
equilibrium.  
Using the second technique, the profits of all DG units were computed by changing the contract prices 
around those obtained from the NLP technique. Fig. 5 plots the profits of DG1 in Case1 for different 
contract prices.  
 
Figure 5: DG1 Profit for Different Contract Prices Near The Optimal Value. 
It can be seen in Fig. 5 that the highest profit of DG1 occurs at the point which obtained by the proposed 
framework. Similarly the contract prices of DG units for different scenarios are checked. Verification 
tests showed that all DGs obtain no higher profits by deviating from the solutions of the NLP technique, 
meaning that the solutions obtained from the NLP technique are indeed optimal. 
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So, the optimality of NLP solution has been successfully checked by two different techniques.  
6 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The performance of the proposed framework in determining DG contract price considering competition 
has been carefully demonstrated and evaluated in the previous sections. The proposed framework can be 
easily used by DisCo or DG owners to propose a contract price with sound and logical economic and 
technical basis. 
While the proposed framework can be easily and extensively used, there are some issue regarding prac-
tical implication of the proposed framework. These issue are addressed in this section.   
6.1. Introduction of Retailer Company  
The proposed framework is based on the assumption that DG sells the electricity merely to DisCo. 
However, in some market structures, retailer companies can buy the DG generation. A question is, then, 
how would be the applicability of the proposed framework in the presence of retailer companies. 
The proposed framework, however, can be easily extended to consider the competition between DisCo 
and retailers companies to buy DG generation. It is only needed to add the optimization problem of the 
retailer companies in the lower level problem. In such case, there would be several lower level problems 
which act as constraints in each DG problem. Substituting the KKT conditions associated with the prob-
lems, a NLP formulation for the problem shall be achieved that can be easily solved to determine the 
DG contract price with DisCo and retailer company.  
However, advanced market structures with retailer also bring other options for DG owners such as par-
ticipating in the demand response programs or peak shaving services. The authors are working on a re-
search project to obtained suitable methods to determine multiple-contract pricing for DG units includ-
ing retailer contract in an advanced market structure. 
6.2. Use of Prices 
It is evident that the current practice for DG pricing does not necessarily follow the proposed pricing 
algorithm. Electricity generation of DG is, generally, purchased by the electric utility at the negotiated 
prices. In some markets, such as Iranian power market, long term fixed-price power purchase contract is 
established between the DG and the utility. DisCo may choose any basis to determine the contract price 
and it can even cross subsidize between its various activities. So, there is no guarantee that the contract 
prices obtained by the proposed framework will be applied.  
However, an important question is how to set the electricity purchase price which is technically and 
economically sound and justifiable. The question becomes more important if different independent DGs 
are located in the network, each of which has different advantage to the electric utility. A technically 
sound framework will be needed in near future to determine optimal contract price. The paper proposes 
a framework to determine the optimal DG contract price and can be used by either DG owners or DisCo 
to determine a techno-ecumenically justifiable contract price. 
7 CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed a framework for optimal contract pricing of dispatchable DG units in the distri-
bution system considering the competition between DG units. A multi-DG equilibrium problem was 
developed to represent the interaction of DG units. Using a multi-period bilevel optimization frame-
work, each DG problem was formulated as an MPEC problem which was transformed into an EPEC 
model considering all DG units. By mathematical reformulation, the resulting EPEC problem was repre-
sented as a nonlinear model and solved using NLP solvers. In addition, two heuristic tests were proposed 
and applied to verify the optimality of the solution. 
The proposed framework was applied to the modified IEEE 34-Bus Test System and the impact of DG       
location, load demand and the capacity of DGs on the contract pricing problem were studied. It was 
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shown that by considering the competition between the DG units, the DisCo will gain more benefits by 
decreasing the operating cost of the system. Moreover, it was observed that considering the competition 
gives higher profit to more beneficial units and can adjust the payments according to the importance of 
each unit to the distribution network. On the other hand, neglecting the competition between the DG 
units may results in an unrealistic solution in which the profit of some DG units may be sacrificed in 
favour of other DGs’ profits. 
The proposed framework captures the competition between DG units properly and can be easily extend-
ed to contain any number of DGs. However, the proposed approach should be extended to include non-
dispatchable DG units as well as the contract between DG units and retailers.  
8 APPENDIX 
Table 9 represents the data associated with 3-Bus Test system. Note that, in Table 9, only the necessary 
data for solving the problem is provided. Thus the impedance magnitude is mentioned instead of re-
sistance and reactance of the lines. The system load was also divided equally among the nodes. 
Table 9: 3-Bus Distribution Test System Data (Based on 10 MVA base) 
 
The extra data used for IEEE 32-Bus distribution Test system are provided in Table 10. 
Table 10: Extra Data for IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Test System (Based on 10MVA base) 
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Figure 1: Schematic of the Proposed Model. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 3-Bus Distribution Test System. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Test System [15]. 
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Figure 4: Annual System Load Duration Curve and Energy Market Price. 
 
Figure 5: Profit of DG1 for Different Contract Prices Near The Optimal Value. 
 
 
Table 1: Competition Results for Simple Example 
Index  With DG Without DG 
Energy Loss (MWh) 0.01 0.057 
Total DisCo Payment (€) 3,173,660.4 3,183,559.2 
DisCo payment to Retailer (€) 2107656 3,183,559.2 
DisCo Payment to DG1 (€) 531556.8 - 
DisCo Payment to DG2 (€) 534447.6 - 
 
Table 2: Computation Details for Simple Example 
Index 
NLP 
Number of Variables of the DisCo Problem 12 
Number of Constraints of DisCo Problem 15 
Number of Variables of Each DG Problem 28 
Number of Constraints of Each DG Problem 33 
Number of Variables NLP Formulation 148 
Number of Constraints NLP Formulation 77 
Total CPU Seconds .53 
Total Solver Iterations 69 
Accuracy 1.6E-9 
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Table 3: Results of Scenario A. 
Index DG Case 1 Case 2 
Contract Price (€/MWh) 
1 79.53 94.65 
2 80.85 83.64 
Annual Generated Energy (MWh) 
1 3504 1752 
2 3504 3504 
Profit (€) 
1 68,433 43,186 
2 73,083 82,834 
 
Table 4: Outcomes in Scenario A. 
Index With DG Without DG 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 1&3 
Energy Loss (MWh) 3,239 3,487 4,721 
Total DisCo Payment (€) 4,269, 480 4,308,010 4,348,877 
DisCo Payment to DG1 (€) 278,539 165,827 - 
DisCo Payment to DG2 (€) 283,298 293,074 - 
DisCo Payment to Market (€) 3,707,643 3,849,107 4,348,877 
DisCo Energy Pur-
chased from Market 
at different price 
levels (MWh) 
80 €/MWh 1,196,165 1,196,165 1,545,991 
70.8 €/MWh 777,321 918,786 1,068,729 
62€/MWh 748,666 748,666 748,666 
50 €/MWh 553,462 553,462 553,462 
41 €/MWh 432,028 432,028 432,028 
 
Table 5: DG Results for Different Cases in Scenario B. 
Index DG Case 3 Case 4 
Contract Price 
(€/MWh) 
1 77.56 75.22 
2 78.82 75.87 
3 76.44 74.58 
4 - 75.82 
Annual Generated Energy 
(MWh) 
1 3504 3504 
2 3504 3504 
3 3504 3504 
4 - 3504 
Profits 
(€) 
1 61,530 53,331 
2 65,924 55,608 
3 57,605 51,088 
4 - 55,433 
 
Table 6: DisCo results for different Cases in scenario B. 
Index Case 3 Case 4 
Energy Loss (MWh) 2,829 2,387 
Total DisCo Payment (€) 4,227,813 4,170,388 
DisCo Payment to DG1 (€) 271,770 263,291 
DisCo Payment to DG2 (€) 276,185 265,849 
DisCo Payment to DG3 (€) 267,846 261,328 
DisCo Payment to DG4 (€) - 265,673 
DisCo Payment to Market (€) 3,412,012 3,114,247 
Energy Purchased 
from Market at 
80 €/MWh 1,036,247 873,984 
70.8 €/MWh 641,609 506,107 
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different price lev-
els (MWh) 
62€/MWh 748,666 748,666 
50 €/MWh 5,53,461 5,53,461 
41 €/MWh 432,028 432,028 
 
Table 7: Competition Impact Evaluation Results 
Index DG Case 1 OW1 
Contract Price 
(€/MWh) 
1 79.53 94.65 
2 80.85 83.64 
Profits (€) 
1 68,433 60,707 
2 73,083 82,834 
Total profits (€) - 141,925 143,541 
DisCo Payments (€) - 4,269, 480 4,303,220 
Losses (MWh) - 3,239 3,488 
 
Table 8: Computation Details 
Index 
Case1 Case 3 Case 4 
NLP Diag. NLP Diag. NLP Diag. 
Number of variables 
per problem  
4,768 1,097 6,834 1,132 8,940 1,157 
Number of constraints 
per problem 
2,928 1,101 4,149 1,136 5,395 1,161 
Number of variables 
total 
4,768 4,388 6,834 6,792 8,940 13,884 
Number of constraints 
total 
2,928 4,404 4,149 6,816 5,395 13,932 
Total CPU seconds per 
problem 
4.992 5.241 13.525 6.833 78.718 17.817 
Total solver iterations 
per problem 
61 196 113 264 411 633 
Total CPU seconds 4.992 20.964 13.525 27.33 78.718 106.9 
Total solver iterations 61 784 113 1056 411 3798 
Accuracy 
1.40E-
9 
7.9E-6 
1.18E-
6 
9.4E-
6 
2.75E-9 6.6E-6 
 
Table 9: 3-Bus Distribution Test System Data (Based on 10 MVA base) 
Item Value Unit 
Line 1-2 Impedance Magnitude 
Line 2-3 Impedance Magnitude 
1.236 
1.144 
p.u. 
p.u. 
Total System Load 0.6 p.u. 
Active Power Demand at Each Node 0.2 p.u. 
Line Load Limit 1 p.u. 
Max. Substation Active Power 4 p.u. 
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Min. Substation Active Power 0 p.u. 
Max. Voltage Magnitude Limit 1.05 p.u. 
Min. Voltage Magnitude Limit 0.9 p.u. 
DG Unit Max. Active Power Limit 1 MW 
DG Unit Min. Active Power Limit  0 MW 
DG Unit Production Cost 60 €/MWh 
 
Table 10: Extra Data for IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Test System (Based on 10MVA base) 
Item Value Unit 
Total System Load 1 p.u. 
Active Power Demand at Each Node 0.03125 p.u. 
Line Load Limit 10 p.u. 
Max. Substation Active Power 10 p.u. 
Min. Substation Active Power 0 p.u. 
Max. Voltage Magnitude Limit 1.05 p.u. 
Min. Voltage Magnitude Limit 0.9 p.u. 
DG Unit Max. Active Power Limit  1 MW 
DG Unit Min. Active Power Limit  0 MW 
DG Unit Production Cost of DG 60 €/MWh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
